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The Hart of the (Mr.) Big Problem
Adelina Iftene*
“I’ll make him an offer he can’t refuse.” (The Godfather)

I. Introduction
In the ’90s the RCMP came up with a method of undercover
investigation currently not employed anywhere in the civilized world:
Mr. Big. This kind of operation involved the suspect being drawn into
a fictitious criminal organization put in place for the sole purpose of
convincing him to confess to a certain crime. The first Mr. Big utilized
by the RCMP was in Evans1 in 1991, followed by Skinner2 in 1992.3
Mr. Big and the confessions thus obtained ran unregulated for over
two decades. Mr. Big investigations were virtually operating within a
legal vacuum. They were outside both the reach of the common law
confessions rule and s. 7 of the Charter which guaranteed a suspect the
right to silence. The common law confessions rule only applied when
the suspect knew he was talking to a person in authority. In Mr. Big
scenarios the suspect was drawn into an undercover operation where
he thought he was associating with criminals.4 On the other hand, s. 7
*

1.
2.

3.
4.

LL.B, LL.M, PhD; Postdoctoral Research Fellow Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University. I would like to deeply thank Professor Allan
Manson for the support given with this paper. I am also grateful to
Professors Don Stuart and Kent Roach for their insightful comments and
suggestions in regards to this article. The discussions I had with Professor
Lisa Dufraimont on the subject have also been of great help. However, the
opinions expressed in this article, as well as its shortcomings, belong entirely
to me.
R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 4 C.R. (4th) 144
(S.C.C.) (Evans).
R. v. Skinner (1992), 17 C.R. (4th) 265, [1993] 2 W.W.R. 739, 84 Man. R.
(2d) 223 (Man. Q.B.), reversed (1993), 1993 CarswellMan 157, [1994] 2
W.W.R. 550, 54 C.R.R. (2d) 326 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1994]
5 W.W.R. lvi, 100 Man. R. (2d) 319 (note), 174 N.R. 235 (note) (S.C.C.).
Kouri T. Keenan and Joan Brockman, Mr. Big. Exposing Undercover
Investigations in Canada, (Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing,
2010), at p. 18. (Keenan & Brockman).
R. v. Grandinetti (2003), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 449, [2004] 11 W.W.R. 662, 339
A.R. 52 (Alta. C.A.), affirmed [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 25
C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) (Grandinetti).
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applied only when the suspect, even if he did not know he was talking
to a person in authority, was in police detention.5 In these operations,
the suspect was not detained. Thus, Mr. Big fell through the cracks of
otherwise thoroughly regulated areas of law.
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hart6 reviewed the
application and evidentiary consequences of Mr. Big operation. For
the majority, Moldaver J. changed the common law confessions rule
so that it applies in Mr. Big scenarios based on a two-pronged test.
Immediately after Hart, the SCC rendered a new decision in R. v.
Mack7 where the two pronged test was leniently applied in favour of
the Crown.
In this article I argue that the SCC approach in Hart and its
application in Mack failed to address the core problems that Mr. Big
operations pose. It is the purpose of this paper to review the decision
in Hart and its subsequent application in Mack, to point out their
shortcomings and to make the case for an alternative solution for the
issues raised by Mr. Big investigations.
First I will set up the background for this article by presenting the
very controversial practices that create Mr. Big. Second, I will
proceed to discuss the Hart decision and the arguments that led the
Supreme Court to reform the common law confessions rule. Third, I
will delve into an analysis of the likely repercussions that Hart will
have on Mr. Big and on the subsequent use of the evidence obtained. I
will do so by evaluating the outcomes of past decisions creating
principled approaches on evidentiary matters, and the trajectory the
SCC has taken in applying Hart only months after its release. I will
argue that, while a great step forward, the Hart decision deals mainly
with the reliability of evidence. This is just one of the issues raised by
Mr. Big, albeit the most discussed in scholarly circles. Mr. Big ignores
a person’s refusal to contribute to his own prosecution, takes
advantage of an individual’s weaknesses, uses him as a means to an
end, encourages “Dirty Harry” practices to obtain a confession, uses
a large amount of the taxpayers’ money to follow a single individual,
and may produce highly unreliable evidence. Suspects’ lives are taken
away and given new ones, in a deity-like display of power. The
investigation purports to be one into a crime that has taken place, but
5.
6.
7.

R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.),
at para. 74 (Hebert).
R. v. Hart, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 544, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 250, 12 C.R. (7th) 221
(S.C.C.) (Hart).
R. v. Mack, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 3, 315 C.C.C. (3d) 315, 13 C.R. (7th) 225 (S.C.C.)
(Mack).
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rather becomes an investigation into the individual that the police
have decided is guilty.
Finally I will attempt to offer a legal argument that would allow
courts to eradicate Mr. Big. Many issues raised by these operations
have been discussed in the literature. Mr. Big impeaches the right to
privacy of an individual presumed innocent, affects her right to
security by destroying her psychological integrity, and leads to
“moral decay”8 by encouraging officers to emerge in a criminal, if
fake, life for months.
I will argue that the net in which the individual is caught in a Mr.
Big scenario is the equivalent of functional detention, and that s. 7
should cover it. Once s. 7 applies, virtually no Mr. Big obtained
evidence would be accepted, which will de facto dissolve such
operations. While I appreciate the effectiveness of these undercover
procedures in obtaining confessions, democratic principles are
compromised in the process, bringing a painful resemblance
between the RCMP practices and the ones of Security institutions
in communist countries, where one’s life was for the police to dictate
at pleasure.

II. Who is Mr. Big?
Mr. Big is different than regular undercover investigations.
Usually police infiltrate a criminal organization with the purpose
of catching the suspect in action. Police do not invent the crime, nor
do they lure the suspect into it. They generally do not have the power
to control the individual in such settings or to manipulate him or her.
The officer is merely joining a life of crime that already exists and gets
access to information and to the suspects’ trust because of his (the
officer’s) efforts to fit within the criminal world. Such operations are
particularly risky, and often the officer’s wellbeing and safety are
under the control of the organization he has joined.
Mr. Big is the opposite of such missions. The police create from
scratch a criminal organization. All the people involved in it are
undercover officers, or their agents. Such operations follow a
scenario that is not regulated and not subject to any outside
scrutiny.9 There are no operation manuals, and no known set of
approvals or authorizations set in place for commencing such stings.
8.
9.

Keenan and Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 92-94.
Timothy E. Moore, Peter Copeland, and Regina A. Schuller, “Deceit,
Betrayal, and the Search for Truth: Legal and Psychological Perspectives on
the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009), 55 Crim. L.Q. 348, at p. 348 (Moore,
Copeland, & Schuller).
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There is no judicial supervision during the investigation and no round
the clock videotaping.10 All the information available to the public on
the RCMP site regarding this technique refers to the fact that “all
undercover operations are subjected to extensive planning, review,
monitoring and approval processes.” The nature of such planning
and monitoring is not made public.11
Mr. Big is all about the state’s control over an individual. The
suspect is observed for long periods of time. She is wiretapped and
followed by officers. Thus, the police become familiar with the
suspects’ habits, friends, hobbies, routines, and most of all,
vulnerabilities. It is at this stage that an undercover officer will
jump in to fill a void in the suspect’s life. The individuals that are
subjected to such operations have generally been named as suspects in
very serious investigations, and often find themselves alienated,
without a job, without friends, and with tense family relationships.
The individual is also particularly vulnerable since such operations
would not work on everybody. The suspect must be predisposed to
outside influences due to low IQ, social stigma, a lifetime of racial
discrimination, mental illness, poverty, etc.12 This information is
obtained during long surveillance and will be used to successfully run
Mr. Big.
The suspect is befriended. Almost always he or she is offered a paid
job — generally driving around, keeping an eye out while the
undercover officer undertakes some transactions, or delivering
parcels. The officer will work on gaining her trust maybe for
months. He will confide in her and be by her side as much as possible.
Sometimes the suspect will be encouraged to break or alienate family
relationships and friends,13 to move cities, and to basically dedicate
her life to this new welcoming organization that makes her feel
valuable. The suspect’s involvement will also amplify. The jobs she
will be assigned will appear to be increasingly illegal. She will be
exposed to manifestations of violence and other practices that are
meant to show her that she is associating with hardened criminals.14
The development of the operation can take different versions. At
10. Keenan and Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at p. 31.
11. Royal Canadian Mounted Police British Columbia, online: 5http://
bc.cb.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/4 (RCMP).
12. Keenan & Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 50-51, have determined that
from 89 cases 11 suspects were aboriginal, and 29 were from very poor social
backgrounds. Others (though numbers were no available) had very poor
education or cognitive capacity.
13. See eg Hart, supra, footnote 6.
14. See e.g., Dix v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), [2003] 1 W.W.R. 436, 315
A.R. 1, 7 Alta. L.R. (4th) 205 (Alta. Q.B.) (Dix).
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one point, the suspect meets the boss, Mr. Big. Meeting the boss is
presented as either a reward for the work the individual did, or as an
interview for a better position within the organization. However, in
all scenarios, Mr. Big wants to be able to trust his people. As a result,
the individuals’ past will come into discussion. Generally, Mr. Big
will bring up the crime under investigation and will request the truth
about it. He will not take no for an answer. The more the individual
tries to deny, the more Mr. Big pushes,15 sometimes by showing that
he has access to (forged) incriminating police documents.16 He may
offer to make the subject’s legal problems disappear.17 In certain
cases the boss volunteers a so called terminally ill associate to take the
fault for the crime, but only if the suspect confesses and shows she is
trustworthy.18 Other times the individual is exposed to an oppressive
environment — she is led to believe that the organization kills people
that cannot be trusted by being shown fake beatings and
kidnappings.19 Finally, the suspect is being told that if she does not
confess she will be either kicked out of the organization, or she will
remain on the side lines of it.20 She will lose her new life, the money,
the friends, and the treats. If however she confesses, not only will she
preserve all these but she has nothing to lose — she will be given
protection and will be even more esteemed within the organization.
The number of cases where the suspect resisted and never confessed is
not known. In some cases, the suspect confessed but the evidence
could not be used because it was clearly a false confession. 21
For the majority of cases, Mr. Big appears to be highly efficient.
According to the RCMP site, until 2008 Mr. Big had been used in 350
15. R. v. Rose (1998), 176 W.A.C. 221, 108 B.C.A.C. 221, 1998 CarswellBC 1321
(B.C. C.A.) (Rose).
16. R. v. Simmonds (2002), 165 C.C.C. (3d) 10, 276 W.A.C. 106, 169 B.C.A.C.
106 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2003), 170 C.C.C. (3d) vi, 310 N.R.
196 (note), 314 W.A.C. 320 (note) (S.C.C.).
17. R. v. Earhart, 2010 CarswellBC 3076, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2202, 2010 BCSC
1602 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (2011), 90 C.R. (6th) 238, 533 W.A.C. 226, 313
B.C.A.C. 226 (B.C. C.A.) (Earhart), Rose, supra, footnote 15, R. v. Bridges
(2005), 200 Man. R. (2d) 313, 2005 CarswellMan 233, 2005 MBQB 142
(Man. Q.B.); R. v. Bridges, 2006 CarswellMan 353, 2006 MBCA 118, 71
W.C.B. (2d) 135 (Man. C.A.) (Bridges).
18. R. v. Mentuck, 2000 CarswellMan 497, 2000 MBQB 155, 47 W.C.B. (2d) 526
(Man. Q.B.) (Mentuck), Dix, supra, footnote 14.
19. Dix, supra, footnote 14, R. v. Terrico (2005), 199 C.C.C. (3d) 126, 31 C.R.
(6th) 161, 353 W.A.C. 135 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2006), 350
N.R. 400 (note), 381 W.A.C. 319 (note), 231 B.C.A.C. 319 (note) (S.C.C.), R.
v. Roberts (1997), 147 W.A.C. 213, 90 B.C.A.C. 213, 1997 CarswellBC 772
(B.C. C.A.).
20. Mentuck, supra, footnote 18, Mack, supra, footnote 7.
21. See e.g. Mentuck, supra, footnote 18.
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situations and the subject was cleared or charged in 75% of the
situations. Also 95% of the cases that made it to trial secured a
conviction.22 However, more precise statistics are not available, no
annual reports are issued, and no exact cost is given. It appears that
the cost of such an operation varies from $137,00023 to $1.624 and $4
million dollars.25 These procedures take months if not years.26
Since the 90s, different superior courts and courts of appeal have
dealt with Mr. Big. In R. v. Osmar,27 the Ontario Court of Appeal
confirmed that these operations are legal. Moreover, evidence
obtained through these techniques cannot be scrutinized under s. 7
of the Charter, because the right to silence applies only when an
individual is detained. In Mr. Big scenarios, the individual was not
considered to be in detention. In addition, the confession rule
argument was systematically rejected for years. The courts argued
that the confession rule and its principled approach (that a confession
needed to be voluntary, free from police trickery and the result of an
operating mind)28 applied only when the accused knew that she was
speaking to a person in authority.29 This was never the case in a Mr.
Big situation. Hence, Mr. Big would regularly fall through the cracks
of the justice system and the evidence obtained as a result remained
unregulated for some two decades.
Some scholars have argued for a regulated approach to such
evidence or for the dissolution of Mr. Big. Psychological studies have
been carried out showing that people do confess to crimes they have
not committed, especially when the context is designed to induce
them.30 Finally, it was argued that Mr. Big, by targeting vulnerable
22. RCMP, supra, footnote 11.
23. Dix, supra, footnote 14.
24. R. v. Skiffington (2004), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 314, 323 W.A.C. 308, 197 B.C.A.C.
308 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2013 CarswellBC 3325, 2013
CarswellBC 3326, [2013] C.S.C.R. No. 291 (S.C.C.) (Skiffington).
25. R. v. Ciancio (2006), 385 W.A.C. 1, 232 B.C.A.C. 1, 2006 CarswellBC 2800
(B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2006), 362 N.R. 399 (note), 401 W.A.C.
318 (note), 243 B.C.A.C. 318 (note) (S.C.C.).
26. For more details on costs and operation durations see Keenan & Brockman,
supra, footnote 3, at pp. 23-24.
27. R. v. Osmar (2007), 217 C.C.C. (3d) 174, 44 C.R. (6th) 276, 84 O.R. (3d) 321
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] 2 S.C.R. vii (note), 85 O.R. (3d)
xviii, 241 O.A.C. 397 (note) (S.C.C.) (Osmar).
28. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 36 C.R. (5th) 129
(S.C.C.) (Oickle).
29. Grandinetti, supra, footnote 4.
30. Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. Gudjonsson,
Richard A. Leo, Allison D. Redlich, “Police-Induced Confessions, Risk
Factors, and Recommendations: Looking Ahead” (2010), 34 Law Hum.
Beh. 49, DOI: 10.1007/s10979-010-9217-5 (Kassin et al.).
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individuals and exposing them to a world of violence and incentives is
particularly coercive, and coercion leads to unreliability.31 It has also
been argued that Mr. Big evidence presented to the jury has a bad
character component — after all, the suspect has voluntarily agreed
to join what he thought was a criminal organization. Mock jury
studies were conducted and have shown that despite the best of jury
instructions, the jury are very likely to be influenced in their decision
by both evidence pertaining to bad character and a confession made
under pressure that the individual retracts at trial.32
Other negative effects of Mr. Big have also been touched upon in
the literature. It has been argued that Mr. Big is an illustration of
moral decay and an encouragement to crime. There were situations
where alcoholics were provided hundreds of dollars in liquor, or were
exposed to enactments of exploitation of women for sexual purposes,
to mock killings, and to extreme foul language.33 Sometimes the
individual was asked to do (fake) drug trafficking, sell firearms,
contract with killers, and forcibly collect debt.34 Intuitively there is
something wrong in attracting someone into such an enterprise,
fueling their bad habits, and giving them gratification for becoming
hardened criminals. There has not been enough research done on
what the effect of such operations are on the people who conduct
them, but alienation of the suspects from the real world and their
submergence into a fictive, rotten one must take a toll at least on the
suspects.
Various propositions have been made by scholars for the reform of
the handling of Mr. Big obtained evidence. Some recommended a
revisiting of the confessions rule: extending the person in authority
criterion to police officers in Mr. Big scenarios.35 Others advocated
for a new type of “shock the community” test to be applied when
dealing with such evidence.36 Others proposed that the statements
31. See e.g., David Milward, “Opposing Mr Big in Principle” (2013), 46:1
U.B.C. L. Rev. 81 (Milward).
32. Keenan & Brockman, supra, footnote 3, pp. at 88-89.
33. Evans, supra, footnote 1, Skiffington, supra, footnote 24.
34. R. v. Caster, 1998 CarswellBC 3186, [1998] B.C.J. No. 3178 (B.C. S.C.),
affirmed (2001), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 404, 47 C.R. (5th) 257, 258 W.A.C. 285
(B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 3 (S.C.C.) (Caster)
R. v. Gobert (2007), 158 C.R.R. (2d) 355, 296 Sask. R. 248, 2007
CarswellSask 243 (Sask. Prov. Ct.), Grandinetti, supra, footnote 4, Hart,
,i>supra, footnote 6, R. v. Joseph, 2000 CarswellBC 2730, 2000 BCSC 219,
52 W.C.B. (2d) 44 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (2003), 301 W.A.C. 155, 183 B.C.A.C.
155, 2003 CarswellBC 1588 (B.C. C.A.), R. v. Proulx (2005), 29 C.R. (6th) 136,
2005 CarswellBC 297, [2005] B.C.J. No. 272 (B.C. S.C.).
35. Moore, Copeland, and Schuller, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 357-358.
36. Amar Khoday, “Scrutinizing Mr Big: Police Trickery, The Confessions Rule,
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made in Mr. Big investigations be treated as hearsay and thus
subjected to the hearsay principled approach test. 37 Some
suggestions were made in regard to extending the use of s. 7 of the
Charter to non-custodial situations. 38

III. R. v. Hart39
In 2002 Hart came under police suspicion for drowning his two
young daughters. He claimed it was an accident, and despite
presenting the police with a contradictory story about what
happened, there was not enough evidence to prosecute him.
Two years later, police placed Hart under surveillance in order to
prepare an undercover operation that would involve him. Police
discovered that he was a socially isolated person, on social welfare
and dependent on his wife. His life had worsened after being
investigated by police for the murder of his daughters.
The operation brought with it the promise of money and friends for
Hart. He was befriended by an undercover officer, Jim, who built
their relationship for months. Jim gave Hart different jobs, took him
out for dinners and shows, and travelled with him across the country,
while forbidding him to take his wife with him. Hart was thus
encouraged to leave behind his old, unfulfilling life, as well as the only
person close to him, in return for money and friends that would feed
him with confidence. The officer prepared him for a very big event
that he was to be involved in and from which he would leave with a lot
of money. Hart became extremely attached to Jim. He declared his
love and loyalty for him on numerous occasions.
A few months after the initial contact, Hart was introduced to the
‘boss’ of the organization. The boss, Mr. Big, would not allow anyone
to be involved in his important dealing if he could not trust them.
Because he had dug into Hart’s past and found something suspicious,
Mr. Big could not trust Hart. Hart was brought in for a meeting with
the boss and he was asked about the killing of his daughters. Hart
denied any intentional killing, claiming he had a seizure. Mr. Big
rejected such explanation, implying that Hart can no longer be
involved with them until he came clean. Hart finally confessed and his
confession was videotaped. It appeared that previously, he also
and the Need to Regulate Extra-Custodial Undercover Interrogations”
(2014), 60 Crim. L.Q. 277, at p. 280 (Khoday).
37. Milward, supra, footnote 31, at pp. 89-95.
38. Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra, footnote 9, at p. 37; Keenan &
Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 65-68.
39. Hart, supra, footnote 6.
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mentioned the killing of his daughters to Jim, under less formal
situations that were not videotaped.
At trial, Hart retracted his confessions, claiming they were
obtained in breach of s. 7 and his right to silence, and that their use
as evidence was an infringement of the rule against hearsay. The trial
judge allowed the confessions into evidence and Hart was convicted.
On appeal, the court excluded the confession using s. 7 of the
Charter.40 The court relied on two cases. In Osmar, despite
legitimizing the Mr. Big operations, the Ontario Court of Appeal
argued that in some situations the control of the state over the
individual might be so great, that it would amount to “functional”
detention and thus would trigger the application of the right to silence
under s. 7.41 Further, in White, the SCC applied the right to silence
outside of the traditional meaning of “detention,” because the
statements were ‘compelled.’42 The court in that case concluded that:
The application of the right to silence, as a component of the principle
against self-incrimination, should be governed by the principles and
values on which it is based, not by the literal language used to describe it
in a given case. Indeed, this is recognized by McLachlin J. in Hebert
where she stated at page 163 that “[a]n investigation of the ambit of a
right or principle of fundamental justice under the Charter necessarily
involves consideration of the underlying value which the right was
designed to protect.43

This led to the conclusion that the right to silence is not necessarily
limited to persons in detention; rather, the real issue is state control. In
principle, if that control exists other than by means of formal
detention, the same analysis should apply.
The court found that the control the state exercised over Hart
triggered the application of the right to silence:
For the reasons given above, Mr. Hart was in the control of the state in a
manner that was equivalent in degree to detention. It was not reasonable
to expect that he would have any reason, or take any opportunity, to
leave the organization. That meant he had to subscribe to the culture of
the organization and to ensure that he continued to receive the
approbation of Mr. Big. Although he obviously wanted to maintain that
he had an innocent explanation for the deaths of his daughters, he
eventually succumbed when it became clear that Mr. Big would accept
40. R. v. Hart (2012), 97 C.R. (6th) 16, 1015 A.P.R. 178, 327 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
178 (N.L. C.A.), affirmed [2014] 2 S.C.R. 544, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 250, 12 C.R.
(7th) 221 (S.C.C.) (Hart, C.A.).
41. Ibid., at para. 182.
42. Ibid., at para. 187.
43. Ibid., at paras. 197-198.
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no other answer than one which accepted his proposition that he was
responsible for their murder. For Mr. Hart in the circumstances in which
he found himself there was very little downside to telling Mr. Big what
he wanted to hear, since he believed the operatives were not police and
he had been assured that any information he gave would be kept from the
authorities. On the other hand, in his mind, Mr. Hart had a great deal to
lose if he did not accede to the required admission.44

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the evidence ought to have
been excluded, but the court was split on the arguments that led to this
conclusion.
Karakatsanis J., in dissent on the approach, borrowed from the
arguments of the Court of Appeal. She argued for an extension of the
understanding of the meaning of ‘detention’ in order to apply the
right to silence and s. 7 to out of custody situations.45 She argued that
a different approach would fail “to take into account broader
concerns that arise when state agents generate a confession at a cost to
human dignity, personal autonomy and the administration of justice.
These concerns are recognized in our jurisprudence dealing with
confessions to the state and lie at the root of the principle against selfincrimination.” 46
Karakatsanis J. maintained that by using their powers to create an
alternate reality “for the accused, police virtually held him under their
control and breached his right to silence. Such practices affect not
only the reliability of the evidence obtained, but also the suspect’s
autonomy and raise issues regarding the state’s abuse of power.”47
Hence, the right to silence is breached, and thus the fairness of the trial
is affected, every time there are concerns regarding autonomy,
reliability and police conduct. She also relied on the White framework
in order to create a case-by-case approach to determine the Mr. Big
situations where the suspect was under the state control. She
proposed that evidence thus obtained be treated as follows:
Consistent with Charter jurisprudence, the onus is on the accused to
establish a prima facie breach of the principle against self-incrimination.
To do so, the accused must show that concerns about autonomy,
reliability, and police conduct exist, as they will in nearly every Mr. Big
operation. In such circumstances, the burden will shift to the Crown to
establish that there is no breach. Consequently, the Crown should always
44. Ibid., at para. 200.
45. For a presentation of the strengths of Karakastanis J.’s decision see Lisa
Dufraimont, “R. v. Hart: Standing Up to Mr. Big” (October 2012) 12:2 C.R.
294, at p. 297 (Dufraimont).
46. Hart, supra, footnote 6, at para. 167.
47. Ibid., at para. 173.
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be prepared to demonstrate the admissibility of the resulting evidence.
This will encourage the police to give careful consideration to the
constitutionality of the operation and will incentivize recording of the
Mr. Big “scenarios” where possible. Given that the entire operation, not
just the final meeting, is relevant to the admissibility of any evidence
obtained, thorough records would make it easier for the court to assess
the investigation and would allow the police to defend against allegations
of undue coercion or state misconduct.48

The 6-1 majority of the SCC took a different approach. Moldaver
J. created a new common law confessions rule that would cover the
statements made by suspects during Mr. Big operations. He affirmed
that such investigations can be very effective and are not always
abusive. Thus, they should be maintained, but under a regulated
framework for the evidence thus obtained. He held that the main
concerns raised by the Mr. Big technique are the reliability of the
evidence obtained, the prejudice such evidence may bring to the
accused, and the risk of police misconduct during the sting.49 As a
result, he proposed a two-pronged approach that would address these
concerns to fill the “legal vacuum” in which such operations are run.
First, where the state recruits an individual in a fictitious criminal
organization, the statements made by the suspect will be
presumptively inadmissible. In order to overcome this
presumption, the Crown will have to show that the probative value
of the evidence is higher than the prejudice.
The first prong recognizes a new common law rule of evidence for
assessing the admissibility of these confessions. The rule operates as
follows. Where the state recruits an accused into a fictitious criminal
organization of its own making and seeks to elicit a confession from him,
any confession made by the accused to the state during the operation
should be treated as presumptively inadmissible. This presumption of
inadmissibility is overcome where the Crown can establish, on a balance
of probabilities, that the probative value of the confession outweighs its
prejudicial effect. In this context, the confession’s probative value turns
on an assessment of its reliability. Its prejudicial effect flows from the
bad character evidence that must be admitted in order to put the
operation and the confession in context. If the Crown is unable to
demonstrate that the accused’s confession is admissible, the rest of the
evidence surrounding the Mr. Big operation becomes irrelevant and thus
inadmissible. This rule, like the confessions rule in the case of
conventional police interrogations, operates as a specific qualification
to the party admissions exception to the hearsay rule.50
48. Ibid., at para. 184.
49. Ibid., at paras. 68-80.
50. Ibid., at para. 85.
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Second, when dealing with probative value, the question will be
whether and to what extent was the reliability affected by the
circumstances under which the statements were obtained. Such
circumstances may include the length of the sting, the number of
operations, the type of inducements employed, the use of threats, the
way the interrogation was conducted, as well as the personality of the
accused and his personal characteristics such as age and mental
capacity. The confession itself will also be scrutinized for markers of
reliability. Elements such as the level of detail, whether it leads to
derivative evidence, whether it identify elements of the crime that
have not been made public, will be taken into account.51
The probative value will be balanced against prejudice. In such
cases there will always be a risk of moral and reasoning prejudice
because presenting the association of the individual with a criminal
organization will be evidence of bad character. The more the suspect
will be involved in the simulated crimes, the more likely it is that the
jury will have moral prejudice against him. In addition, lengthy,
controversial events may occur which may confuse the jury, thus
raising reasoning prejudice. The court believed that such prejudice
can be mitigated by giving limiting instructions to the jury or by
excluding parts of the evidence that are not essential to the
narrative.52 The court concluded that:
The rule of evidence I have proposed goes a long way toward addressing
all three of the concerns raised by Mr. Big operations. It squarely tackles
the problems they raise with reliability and prejudice. And it takes
significant account of the concern regarding police misconduct both by
placing the admissibility onus on the Crown, and by factoring the
conduct of the police into the assessment of a Mr. Big confession’s
probative value.53

The first prong is concerned almost entirely with reliability. The
second one reflects both on reliability and on the police conduct
which may affect the integrity of the justice system:
Violence and threats of violence are two forms of unacceptable coercion.
But Mr. Big operations can become coercive in other ways as well.
Operations that prey on an accused’s vulnerabilities — like mental health
problems, substance addictions, or youthfulness — are also highly
problematic [. . .] Taking advantage of these vulnerabilities threatens
trial fairness and the integrity of the justice system. As this Court has
said on many occasions, misconduct that offends the community’s sense
51. Ibid., at paras. 102-103.
52. Ibid., at paras. 106-107.
53. Ibid., at para. 111.
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of fair play and decency will amount to an abuse of process and warrant
the exclusion of the statement54

Both the majority and the minority adopted a principled approach
for assessing evidence obtained as a result of Mr. Big operations. The
majority created a new common law evidentiary rule to address
concerns regarding evidence reliability, prejudice, and abuse of
process. The minority would have extended the application of the
right to silence under s. 7 to Mr. Big situations based on an analysis of
the degree of coercion used, the reliability of evidence, and the abuse
of process.55
I argue that both approaches are concerned first and foremost with
enhancing the credibility of the evidence utilized in court. All of the
factors addressed — prejudice, abuse of process, coercion, are
elements that would affect either the quality of the statement
obtained or the capacity of the jury to render an objective verdict.
With respect, I believe the court offers only a partial solution to a
bigger problem than the one it framed. Mr. Big impeaches the fairness
of the trial as a whole, evidence reliability being just a part of it. As
long as Mr. Big is legal, evidence will continue to be extracted in such
manner. Even if excluded afterwards, justice is not served.

IV. Effects of Hart
The majority in Hart decided to maintain the legitimacy of Mr. Big
operations. What changed was the approach courts must take
regarding the admission of confessions obtained as a result of such
investigations. Before Hart, such statements, escaping both the reach
of s. 7 and of the confessions rule, were treated as generally
admissible. In certain situations, the courts could exercise their
inherent discretion to exclude the confessions if they believed the
prejudice was higher than the probative value,56 or if the defendant
54. Ibid., at para. 117.
55. For a positive critique of Hart see Dufraimont, supra, footnote 45, Lisa
Dufraimont, “Hart and Mack: New Restraints on Mr. Big and a New
Approach to Unreliable Prosecution Evidence” (2015), S.C.L.R. (forthcoming) (Dufraimont, Hart and Mack); David M. Tanovich, “R v. Hart: A
Welcome New Emphasis on Reliability and Admissibility” (October 2014)
12:2 C.R. 298. For a presentation of the shortcomings of the decision see H.
Archibald Kaiser, “Hart: More Positive Steps Needed to Rein in Mr. Big
Undercover Operations” (October 2014) 12:2 C.R. 304 (Kaiser).
56. The discretion to exclude this type of evidence was used only in one Mr. Big
case – R. v. Creek, 1998 CarswellBC 3045, [1998] B.C.J. No. 3189, 42 W.C.B.
(2d) 238 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed 2000 CarswellBC 1922, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1932,
2000 BCCA 513 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2001), 270 N.R. 191
(note), 255 W.A.C. 160 (note), 156 B.C.A.C. 160 (note) (S.C.C.), reconsi-
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could prove abuse of process. Both instances were rare in practice.57
Acknowledging the high risks associated with such stings, the SCC
in Hart stated that while Mr. Big was legal, evidence obtained should
be presumed inadmissible. However, that is not to say it could not be
used. The burden of proof would shift from the defendant to the
Crown. Recognizing that the defendant was already in a
disadvantaged position, the Crown would be asked to prove that
the evidence obtained had a high probative value, higher than the
prejudice that may be brought to the minds of the trier of fact. In
addition, the Crown would have to prove that no mistreatment has
occurred on the side of the police. Thus the police could not have
threatened or assaulted the suspect, or taken advantage of his
personal vulnerabilities.
Considering the extremely high prejudicial impact of such
evidence,58 the very questionable quality of these confessions,59
and the fact that in most cases the suspects were either psychologically
or economically disadvantaged individuals, one might think that this
decision would, at least indirectly, lead to an eradication of Mr. Big.
However, two months after the decision in Hart, the SCC applied
the two pronged test in a similar situation, only to conclude that the
confession was admissible. In R. v. Mack,60 the operation against the
suspect began some two years after the murder was committed. Mack
was befriended by the undercover officer Ben, and was given well paid
work. Over the next few months their friendship grew and Mack was
led to understand that his new friend was involved in lucrative
criminal affairs. While acknowledging that he had dirty things in his
past, Mack refused to talk about any murder. Eventually, he was told
that he must confess to murder if he wished to advance in the
organization and be part of the better paid job. When he finally met
the boss, Liam, Mack initially refused to talk about the murder. After
a couple more attempts, he finally admitted the murder, only to

57.
58.
59.

60.

deration / rehearing refused 2001 CarswellBC 1158, 2001 BCCA 372, 50
W.C.B. (2d) 288 (B.C. C.A.).
Hart, supra, footnote 6, at para. 65.
For a discussion of the inherent prejudice attached to such confessions see
Keenan & Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at p. 86.
For a critique of the reliability of Mr. Big confessions in previous cases see
Keenan & Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 76-85; Moore, Copeland, and
Schuller, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 357-360; Steven M. Smith, Veronica
Stinson, and Marc W. Patry, “High-Risk Interrogations: Using the Mr. Big
Technique to Elicit Confessions” (2010), 34 Law Hum. Behav. 39, DOI:
10.1007/s10979-009-9203-y, at p. 40.
Mack, supra, footnote 7. For a commentary to the case see Lisa Dufraimont,
“R. v. Mack” (December 2014) 13:2 C.R. 225, at pp. 229-230.
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retract it later. Subsequently, he re-admitted the murder and stuck
with the confession. It was then that he was arrested. In four months
he had been paid $5,000 cash plus dinners and hotels across the
country. He was promised in exchange for a confession to be involved
in affairs worth up to $30,000. At trial, there were two witnesses who
also testified that Mack had made references to them as to his
involvement in the murder. The trial and appeal were heard before the
decision in Hart. The evidence was admitted and Mack convicted.61
The SCC heard the case, and Moldaver J for a unanimous court
applied the two pronged test he developed in Hart. However, he did
not mention anything about such evidence being prima facie
inadmissible. He compared the prejudicial effects to the probative
value of the confession, and found the latter was higher. The fact that
the confession was corroborated by some circumstantial evidence
likely influenced the decision. As well, the court found no threats and
only “modest inducements.” It was also decided that the prejudice
was not high. Though Mack’s involvement in the organization clearly
amounted to bad character evidence, the court considered that the
fact that he was not involved in any acts of violence limited the
prejudice. Thus, the court concluded that the confession was
admissible.62
The situations in Hart and Mack were different, especially because
in Mack there was corroborative evidence available, which enhanced
the reliability of the confessions. However, the substance of the Mr.
Big operations was the same. It was a months-long operation in which
a man presumed innocent was lured and promised different riches. He
repeatedly refused to talk about any murder but he was persistently
enticed into doing so. Nonetheless, the court had no difficulty
concluding, in a rather brief decision, that “this [the application of the
two pronged test to the case] poses no difficulty as these confessions
would clearly be admissible under that framework.”63
After Mack, the Hart test has been applied six times by lower
courts. The evidence was admitted in five of these situations.64 Only
61.
62.
63.
64.

Mack, supra, footnote 7, at paras. 4-16.
Ibid., at paras. 31-36.
Ibid., at para. 32.
R. v. Balbar, 2014 CarswellBC 4056, [2014] B.C.J. No. 3232, 2014 BCSC
2285 (B.C. S.C.); R. v. Keene, 2014 CarswellOnt 19056, [2014] O.J. No. 6511,
2014 ONSC 7190 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Hales (2014), 463 Sask. R. 13, 2014
CarswellSask 833, [2014] S.J. No. 750 (Sask. Q.B.), affirmed 2015
CarswellSask 759, [2015] S.J. No. 647, 2015 SKCA 131 (Sask. C.A.); R. v.
Ledesma, 2014 CarswellAlta 2613, [2014] A.J. No. 1468, 2014 ABQB 788
(Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Magoon (2015), 594 A.R. 272, 2015 CarswellAlta 975,
[2015] A.J. No. 607 (Alta. Q.B.).
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the Quebec Court of Appeal in Laflamme ordered a stay of
procedures because the Mr. Big operation was an abuse of
process.65 All cases included highly problematic situations (high
amount of drug consumption by the suspects, as well as serious
monetary incensements) but the evidence in the first five cases was
considerably more reliable than in Hart or Laflamme.66 This
approach reinforces the fact that the Hart and Mack framework
provides just another step that the Crown needs to take in having the
evidence admitted, as opposed to a real obstacle to the admission of
evidence obtained through deceit and manipulation.67
It appears that thus far courts adopted a “soft application” of the
Hart framework. It is likely that this trend will continue, considering
that Canadian evidence law has a history of revolutionary decisions
applied in a very permissive way. Thresholds apparently set high have
been lowered in their subsequent application.
The decision in Oickle68 reformed the confessions rule. The
standards established to assess what statements were voluntarily
made were set high — they were targeting not just formal
voluntariness (“fine, I’ll confess”) but rather a substantive one. The
confession had to be the result of an operating mind (the accused had
to be aware of what he was saying and what the consequences might
be). He could not be induced into confessing or threatened. The
circumstances in which he was detained could not be oppressive (such
as deprivation of sleep, food, water, coffee, cigarettes, appropriate
temperature, clothing, etc.). Finally police trickery that would
“shock the conscience of the community” was not acceptable.
The framework created by the majority in Oickle appeared to set a
high standard for the protection of the accused’s rights and the
integrity of the justice system. However, Oickle was subsequently
applied in a very permissive manner. In Spencer,69 the suspect was
interrogated for hours and was offered leniency for his girlfriend, in
addition to a visit with her, if he confessed. After endless denials, he
made an incriminating statement. The court found in applying Oickle
65. R. c. Laflamme (2015), 23 C.R. (7th) 137, 2015 CarswellQue 8901, EYB
2015-256752 (C.A. Que.).
66. See Lisa Dufraimont’s review of the first five cases in Dufraimont, Hart and
Mack, supra, footnote 55, at pp. 14-15.
67. For a similar critique of Mack which also extends to other aspects of the
decision see H. Archibald Kaiser, “Mack: Mr. Big Receives an Undeserved
Reprieve, Recommended Jury Instructions Are Too Weak” (December
2014) 13:2 C.R. 251. (Kaiser, Mack).
68. Oickle, supra, footnote 28.
69. R. v. Spencer, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 44 C.R. (6th) 199
(S.C.C.) (Spencer).
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that the inducement and the threats were not strong enough to affect
the voluntariness of the confession. The majority argued that as long
as the individual did not lose control over the interview, and he had a
choice, voluntariness was not affected. For the dissent, Fish J.
expressed his opinion that the idea behind Oickle was not one of
choice, but rather of the overbearing of will to the point where the
individual was persuaded to confess in order to achieve an expected
result.
The low standard of application was maintained in a subsequent
decision, R. v. Singh.70 In Singh the accused maintained 18 times that
he did not want to talk and that he wanted a lawyer. However the
police continued to interrogate him for hours until he gave in. The
SCC decided that neither the confession rule set up in Oickle, nor the
right to silence protected by s. 7 of the Charter were breached. The
court argued that the right to silence did not include the right not to be
talked to, even if that meant being for hours in an interrogation room,
listening to the officers, and being released only when he confessed.
Once again, Fish J. dissented. He argued that the suspect was under
state’s control, was depended on the officers for his necessaries of
living, and his assertions not to speak were systemically disregarded.
Singh was deemed “an especially disappointing” decision.71
Oickle is an example of an articulated framework whose purpose
has been severely diminished in its subsequent application. If the past
is any indication, Hart is suffering the same faith. As in Oickle, the
court in Hart did not set any standards for key concepts such as
prejudice, probative value and abuse of power.72 It is indeed
unfortunate, because the courts had the opportunity to apply their
discretion and exclude evidence based on little probative value or
police maltreatment even before Hart.73 In Hart, the court was
expected to bring some consistent protection to the accused against
the state’s overwhelming power and it might have missed that
opportunity.
It remains to be seen if the SCC will redeem itself in the application
of Hart. What is clear so far is that the Court engaged in setting a
principled approach for the use of evidence resulting from a very
problematic method of investigation. On other evidentiary issues,
such attempts have subsequently been watered down. In addition,
70. R. v. Singh (2007), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 103, 51 C.R. (6th)
199 (S.C.C.) (Singh).
71. Don Stuart, “Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law”, 6th ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 2014) at p. 150 (Stuart).
72. For a similar opinion see Kaiser, Mack, supra, footnote 67, at p. 251.
73. See e.g., Dufraimont, supra, footnote 45, at p. 295.
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after Mack and the subsequent lower court decisions, it is also clear
that the use of the Mr. Big technique continues to be encouraged with
little incentive for the RCMP to substantially restructure it.

V. A Potential Solution: Using s. 7 to Eliminate Mr. Big
The decision in Oickle, with all its promises, was considered
disappointing from certain points of view, even before it was applied
in Spencer and Singh. Don Stuart argued:
A major disappointment of Oickle is that the Court has clearly deemphasized the important emerging common law position that a
confession should be excluded because a particular police interrogation
practice is oppressive and should not be condone.74

He also mentioned that two of the most problematic aspects of Oickle
are the fact that it places the focus largely on reliability rather than
police methods and it “provides the police with a manual for a wide
range of excessively coercive interrogation techniques.”75
These statements seem to apply fully to the decision in Hart. The
Supreme Court of Canada chose to deal with the disturbing issues
raised by Mr. Big by addressing only one aspect of it, the reliability of
evidence. I argue that evidence reliability is solely the tip of the
iceberg. The tip may have been removed, but the iceberg is still there,
even less visible than before. The heart of the problem with Mr. Big
are the police methods employed against a suspect, once he already
asserted (when in police custody) his desire not to speak. By
employing tricks and creating with great financial and human
resources a fictitious life for the suspect, police are virtually negating
the right not to contribute to his incrimination. Hart allows police to
infiltrate themselves into someone’s life, to change it, adapt it, and
elicit the wanted statement as long as no means that would make it
unreliable are employed. There is very little concern with the fact that
the state is virtually taking control of one’s life, takes advantage of his
greed or addictions, and uses them to obtain indirectly what it is
forbidden by law to obtain directly.

(a) Section 7 and the Right to Silence
Section 7 provides that: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”76 It has been
interpreted that s. 7 basically confers a negative right — the right not
74. Stuart, supra, footnote 71, at pp. 163-164.
75. Ibid., at p. 156.
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to be deprived of life, liberty and security, except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice.77 Section 7 has been regarded as
a versatile tool for the creation of new protections for suspects in
criminal cases.78 Life, liberty, and security are not absolute rights and
they need to be balanced against the fundamental principles of
justice. What such principles are has been a highly controversial
matter for decades, and to the present it lacks a clear definition.
However, some fundamental principles of justice have been defined
in the context of s. 7 and criminal law. Such principles include the
right to silence.
In Hebert,79 the right to silence was described as a pre-trial right, in
addition to the right against self-incrimination (s. 11(c)), the right to
counsel (s. 10) and the right not to be incriminated by evidence
provided as a witness in a different proceeding (s. 13). Hebert
summarized this right by asserting that the person who’s freedom is in
question, has the right to decide whether they choose to speak or
not.80 The essence of this decision rests within the common law
voluntary confessions rule, as well as the privilege against selfincrimination recognized by s. 11 of the Charter.81
The rationale of the right to silence was described as the protection
of individual freedom and the integrity of the justice system.82 Hebert
extended the application of this right to prevent the police from using
tricks and thus obtaining indirectly what they could not obtain
directly. An undercover police officer eliciting information about the
crime, after the suspect has already refused to speak to the authorities,
has a de facto effect of depriving the suspect of his choice.83 In order
not to impeach too gravely the state’s options in carrying out an
investigation, the Court limited the application of Hebert to
situations where the suspect was in detention and where the
statement was actively elicited by an undercover police officer or a
police informant. Thus if the police agent was simply observing the
accused without asking anything, and the accused spontaneously
confessed, s. 7 would not be infringed.84 For s. 7 to apply to elicited
76. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982,
Schedule B to Canada act 1982 (UK).
77. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (2013, Toronto: Carswell), at
pp. 47-3 (Hogg); Stuart, supra, footnote 71, at p. 61.
78. Stuart, supra, footnote 71, at p. 61.
79. Hebert, supra, footnote 5.
80. Ibid., at para. 65.
81. Stuart, supra, footnote 71, at p. 144.
82. Ibid., at p. 130.
83. Hebert, supra, footnote 5, at para. 66.
84. Ibid., at para. 76.
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confessions the police conduct must have “effectively and unfairly
deprived the suspect of the right to choose whether to speak to the
authorities or not”85 and that the accused be under the control of the
state. The court also mentioned that “In an undercover operation
prior to detention, the individual from whom the information is
sought is not under the control of the state. There is no need to protect
him from the greater power of the state.”86
In Broyles, the Court confirmed the rationale of the right to silence
as being to “prevent the use of state power to subvert the right of an
accused to choose whether or not to speak to the authorities.” Thus,
as long as the evidence was actively elicited by a state agent, s. 7 would
apply. 87
In subsequent cases, attempts were made to define “detention” or
“state control.” For example, the obligation to self-identify to a
police officer or the use of voice identification in a courtroom were
considered breaches of the right to silence.88 A very important
example is provided by White, in which the court decided that the
obligation of a driver to provide an accident report was a breach of the
right against self-incrimination under s. 7 because the report could be
used to convict the individual and sentence him to imprisonment.
Thus, statutorily compelled information could not be used in
criminal trials against the person providing the information.89
Continuing the line of thinking in Hebert and Broyles, the Court in
White stated that:
It is now well-established that there exists, in Canadian law, a principle
against self-incrimination that is a principle of fundamental justice under
s 7 of the Charter . . . The principle has at least two key purposes, namely
to protect against unreliable confessions, and to protect against abuses of
power by the state. 90

Further, in Turcotte, the Supreme Court applied the right to silence
to exclude the statement given by the accused to an officer, even
though he was not detained.91 The suspect was interviewed by the
police before being formally placed in custody. During the trial, the
85. Ibid., at para. 75
86. Ibid., at para. 74.
87. R. v. Broyles (1991), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 308, 9 C.R. (4th) 1
(S.C.C.), at para. 11.
88. Stuart citing Leitch and Gordon, supra, footnote 71, at p. 147.
89. Hogg, supra, footnote 77, at pp. 47-71.
90. R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, 135 C.C.C. (3d) 257, 24 C.R. (5th) 201
(S.C.C.) (White).
91. R. v. Turcotte (2005), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 31 C.R. (6th)
197 (S.C.C.) (Turcotte).
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Crown relied heavily on the person’s conduct during that interview
and his refusal to answer some questions. According to the
prosecution, his behaviour was the result of a “guilty mind.”92 The
SCC rejected the evidence, and stated that a person’s refusal to
cooperate with the police cannot be used against him. Using his
silence as proof of his state of mind equalled denying him the right to
be silent.93 It should, however, be noted that the Charter was not
expressly mentioned in this case.

(b) The Application of the Right to Silence in Mr. Big Cases
This line of cases enforces the argument that detention should be
seen as basically synonymous with control by the state over an
individual, the power to compel the person to say something, and
then use it against her.
Hebert did mention that the right to silence does not apply to
undercover operations where the individual is not detained. 94
However, at that time, the most commonly used undercover
operations were not of the Mr. Big type. Rather, they consisted of
stings where police informants or undercover agents infiltrate an
existing criminal organization and are witnessing the commissions of
crimes by their suspects. The officers get involved in a smaller or
larger proportion, often times having to gain the trust of the
organization’s members. They do not usually instigate the crimes
even though they may partake in them. In these situations, even where
the undercover officer elicits statements from the suspects, it is
obvious that they (the suspects) are not under state control. Rather,
they are in their environment, doing their daily routines, and they
regard the informant as another of their fellow criminals. It logically
follows that s. 7 could not reasonably attach to such situations.
Mr. Big stings are different and they were not even in use at the time
the Hebert decision was rendered. The individual is in fact extracted
from his environment, by promises of a better life and in time, his life
is virtually reduced to the relationships he has with his new friends
and partners, the undercover officers. I suggest that, despite the
Osmar and Hart decisions to the contrary, the subject of a Mr. Big
operation is under the de facto control of the state. If we accept this
statement, then we should accept, as per Hebert and Broyles
presented above, that such operations trigger the application of s. 7
and the evidence should virtually always be excluded.
92. Ibid., at para 30.
93. Ibid., at paras 55- 57.
94. Hebert, supra, footnote 5, at para. 76.
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Section 7 arguments have generally been rejected by courts when
brought up in Mr. Big cases. The Ontario Court of Appeal is the best
example of reasoning for such rejection. In Osmar, the defense
invoked s. 7 for exclusion of a statement obtained during a Mr. Big
operation, arguing that “trickery combined with elicitation can
amount to coercion and there is no need for detention.”95 The court
responded by saying that:
It may be that the right to silence recognized in Hebert could be extended
to a case where the accused, although not in detention, was nevertheless
under the control of the state in circumstances functionally equivalent to
detention and equally needing protection from the greater power of the
state. But that is not this case. This appellant was not under the control of
the state nor was the context such as to require that he be protected from
the greater power of the state. The appellant’s assertion that elicitation
and trickery are sufficient to require Charter scrutiny is not supportable
by the authorities or by a reasoned extension of the principles in those
cases.96

The Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that White extended the
application of s 7 to people not in detention, but argued that it did not
lead to a re-evaluation of the right.97
The British Columbia Court of Appeal also rejected the s. 7
argument in the Earhart decision. While, Osmar maintained that
trickery and elicitation is not enough, Earhart98 decided that as long
as the individual does not know that he is speaking to a person in
authority, s. 7 does not apply. The Court used this argument to
differentiate Earhart from Turcotte,99 where the SCC allowed the
application of s. 7 to a statement given by an individual who was not in
detention but knew that he was speaking to a person in authority.100 It
appears that this court is suggesting that in order for s. 7 to apply, the
suspect must have either been in detention, or was aware that he was
speaking to a person in authority. Mr. Big operations fall in between
these two situations.
The application of s. 7 to Mr. Big was finally attempted by the
Court of Appeal in Hart101 and by Karakastanis J. at the Supreme
Court level.102 Both judgements relied on the framework offered in
95. Osmar, supra, footnote 27.
96. Ibid., at para. 42.
97. Ibid., at para. 30.
98. Earhart, ,i>supra, footnote 17
99. Turcotte, supra, footnote 91.
100. Earhart, supra, footnote 17, at para. 76.
101. Hart C.A., supra, footnote 40.
102. Hart, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 164-243.
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White for the extension of the right to silence outside police custody.
While both arguments are very strong, I argue they do not go far
enough. Whenever the White framework is employed, s. 7 can only be
applied on a case-by-case basis and the result is very similar to that of
the Moldaver J.’s new confessions rule. As opposed to Hebert which
clearly forbade any attempt to elicit information by police informants
in custody, in White “the principle does not provide absolute
protection against all uses of information that has been compelled by
statute or otherwise; the residual protections provided by the
principle against self-incrimination as contained in s. 7 are specific,
and contextually sensitive”103

(c) A Different Approach to the “Right to Silence — Mr. Big”
Relationship
In trying to find innovative arguments to extend the application of
the right to silence to Mr. Big situations, the courts and defense
lawyers have failed to see that in fact such scenarios fit the category of
situations where this right has been applied. Hebert stated, and the
subsequent jurisprudence confirmed that, s. 7 applies in the situations
where a suspect has refused to speak to the police, is in police custody,
and his confession is elicited by undercover officers. Police custody
has been described as the instance where the state has control over the
individual and thus may temper his choice whether to speak or not.
The reason why this right applies is to protect the individual’s
freedom and the integrity of the justice system.104
In Mr. Big scenarios, all suspects are explicitly refusing to speak to
the police. In fact, that is the reason why this operation is
commenced.105 In all operations their confession is actively elicited
by an undercover officer. At the time the confession is elicited, the
suspect is under the control of the state, even if he does not know it,
and his choice of speaking is seriously restricted. The state control is
not diminished by the fact that the suspect does not know he is dealing
with state agents. “The state’s agents are not rendered impotent
simply because they are pretending not to be state agents,”106 but they
are in fact empowered by the suspect’s blissful ignorance to
manipulate him into dropping his guard down.
Because of the state’s control over the individual, he is held during
the operation in functional detention. As per Osmar, functional
103. White, supra, footnote 90, at para. 45.
104. Hebert, supra, footnote 5, at para. 62.
105. Kennan & Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at p. 65.
106. Moore, Copeland, and Schuller, supra, footnote 9, at p. 378.
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detention equals detention.107 I would go further than both the Court
of Appeal and Karakastanis J. in Hart and argue that functional
detention should not be determined on a case-by-case basis in Mr. Big
stings. State control is at the heart of such operations: without
functional detention such stings cannot succeed. As a result, s. 7 will
nearly always apply, making the entire operation legally problematic.
There are three elements of a Mr. Big situation that support the
conclusion that all such operations include substantial degrees of
state control.

(i) Planning and Surveillance108
Any Mr. Big subject is under surveillance for sometimes months.
The police familiarize themselves with the most intimate details of the
individuals’ lives, as well as their weaknesses — alcohol, drugs,
money, and the fear for their own legal case.109 This is where the state
begins asserting control — because knowing one’s weaknesses and
having the resources to exploit them gives one an extremely high
leverage over the person. This information is used by highly trained
professionals to design an operation that will be successful. What that
requires depends on the subject. In some Mr. Big cases the individuals
confessed just because they wanted to get in on a bigger deal.110 In
other situations it took much greater efforts to obtain a confession,
from convoluted threats to the suspect and his family, to promises of
making the suspect’s problems go away.111 This does not mean that
some individuals were less manipulated. What it does mean is that
some individuals were easier to manipulate than others and more
susceptible to inducements.

(ii) Fear and Promises
Examples of the weaknesses exploited in Mr. Big cases are limited
just by the officers’ creativity. Some individuals, after being suspects
in a murder trial, suffer greatly from a social standpoint. They lose
their friends and family and have a hard time finding a job.112 Hence
they are offered an opportunity for easy money and loyal friends.113
107. Osmar, supra, footnote 26.
108. For a detailed description of surveillance and recruitment see Keenan &
Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 53-56
109. Mr. Big: A Documentary, 2010, DVD, (Eagle Harbour Entertainment, 2010),
interview with Unger (Mr. Big: A Documentary).
110. Mentuck, supra, footnote 18.
111. R. v. Fliss (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 227 W.A.C. 89, 139 B.C.A.C. 89 (B.C.
C.A.), affirmed [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535, 161 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 49 C.R. (5th) 395
(S.C.C.) (Fliss); Dix, supra, footnote 14.
112. Hart, supra, footnote 6, Mentuck, supra, footnote 18.
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Other people are addicts, and the undercover police have no problem
spending thousands of dollars on liquor for them. 114 These
undereducated, often poor individuals, in trouble with the law,
isolated, and not uncommonly with substance abuse problems, are
being valued in their new environment.115 They do not just get a job,
but a career, albeit a criminal one. They are shown the benefits of
being criminals. Some of the individuals are already thugs, but they
are being introduced to high style, productive criminality. They are
shown that they are good at it, they have friends, they get credit, they
are respected, they will get rich, and most of all, there will be no
consequences. On the contrary, everything from their previous life
will be erased. So they confess. Sometimes they are not guilty; other
times they are. What is certain is that these individuals would have
never confessed had they not been drawn in an alter life that they
cannot leave.
To create the illusion of an alternative life which responds exactly
to the needs of a certain individual requires resources — money,
trained people, and information (generally obtained from the
preliminary surveillance).116 It is very hard to see how these are not
expressions of the control exercised by the state.

(iii) Meaningful Choice of Leaving the Organization
The reasons why individuals cannot leave this life are sometimes
extreme. In some cases individuals were led to believe that harm
would come upon them and their families.117 Other times, leaving this
life would mean facing their (exaggerated by the undercover officers)
legal problems.118 Often, knowing that they entered a criminal
113. R. v. Anderson (2009), 243 C.C.C. (3d) 134, 448 A.R. 165, 3 Alta. L.R. (5th)
29 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2010), 259 C.C.C. (3d) iv, 510 A.R.
399 (note), 413 N.R. 391 (note) (S.C.C.), R. v. MacMillan, 2000 CarswellBC
3039, [2000] B.C.J. No. 2907, 2000 BCSC 1614 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (2003),
302 W.A.C. 239, 184 B.C.A.C. 239, 2003 CarswellBC 1555 (B.C. C.A.).
114. Evans, supra, footnote 1.
115. Keenan & Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at p. 50.
116. For a description of the psychological effects exercised by state due to its
resources see Moore, Copeland, and Schuller, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 378381.
117. Dix, supra, footnote 14; Mr. Big: A Documentary, supra, footnote 109,
interviews with Dix and Mentuck.
118. Fliss, supra, footnote 111; Grandinetti, supra, footnote 4, Caster, supra,
footnote 34, Washington (State) v. Burns, 2002 CarswellBC 3907, 2002
BCSC 1935, 80 W.C.B. (2d) 897 (B.C. S.C.), R. v. Forknall, 2000 CarswellBC
3114, 2000 BCSC 1694, 71 W.C.B. (2d) 575 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed (2003), 172
C.C.C. (3d) 61, 290 W.A.C. 284, 176 B.C.A.C. 284 (B.C. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused (2004), 329 N.R. 196 (note), 345 W.A.C. 159 (note), 209
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organization, they were aware that, no matter what they are told,
“you cannot just leave and expect to be safe.”119 The court has tried to
limit these extreme situations by the Hart ruling, by reducing the use
of such evidence because it is unreliable. However, what the court
missed is that even in the milder situations, where no such threats or
strong inducements are present, the suspect still cannot leave the
organization. Jason Dix said in an interview “the lure of the money
kept me going and gave me a reason to be someone I wasn’t”, while
Unger said “they feed off your greed.”120 In all Mr. Big situations, the
suspect has basically been given a new “identity” by this criminal
organization. She is the product of the enterprise. If she leaves she will
have to leave her new self behind with the glamour of the new world,
and this is not something she is psychologically capable of doing.
These individuals have been hand-picked by trained officers to be
subjected to this type of sting, from a poll of suspects in different cases
that have gone cold. The choice is not random, hence the need for
preliminary surveillance. Arguably, if the officers thought there
would be a chance the individual will leave the organization midthrough, they would not spend $400,000 of taxpayers’ money on such
an operation.
If the control exercised in Mr. Big stings is accepted as a de facto or
functional detention, these situations would be covered by Hebert. It
would mean that undercover police officers would never be able to
elicit information. When a confession is elicited it would be
automatically excluded under s. 24(2).121 That would virtually
cover all confessions obtained through such operations. One of the
main steps in these stings is the meeting with Mr. Big, when the subject
has to come clean. There has been no Mr. Big case where the
confession was not elicited, but rather “observed.” Thus, s. 7 and the
B.C.A.C. 159 (note) (S.C.C.).Bridges, supra, footnote 17, R. v. Bicknell, 2003
CarswellBC 2478, 2003 BCSC 1522, 59 W.C.B. (2d) 425 (B.C. S.C.), R. v.
Joseph, 2000 CarswellBC 2730, 2000 BCSC 219, 52 W.C.B. (2d) 44 (B.C.
S.C.), affirmed (2003), 301 W.A.C. 155, 183 B.C.A.C. 155, 2003 CarswellBC
1588 (B.C. C.A.), R. v. Fischer (2005), 197 C.C.C. (3d) 136, 350 W.A.C. 199,
212 B.C.A.C. 199 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2005), 349 N.R. 393
(note), 376 W.A.C. 319 (note), 228 B.C.A.C. 319 (note) (S.C.C.), R. v.
Wytyshyn, 2002 CarswellAlta 1400, [2002] A.J. No. 1389, 2002 ABCA 229
(Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2003] 2 S.C.R. xi (note), 346 A.R. 137
(note), 363 A.R. 194 (note) (S.C.C.).
119. Mr. Big: A Documentary, supra, footnote 109, interview with Jason Dix.
120. Ibid., interviews with Dix and Unger. Both for subjects of Mr. Big operations
where they confessed. The prosecution withdraw charges midway through
trial because they estimate there was no reasonable chance of conviction.
121. Hebert, supra, footnote 5, at paras. 70-80
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breach of the right to silence could act as a good motivator for the
courts to illegitimatize the use of such operations.
Finally, while Hebert expressly excluded undercover
operations,122 this was likely intended to apply to the regular, more
commonly used undercover operations where the agent infiltrates an
existing criminal organization. Mr. Big differs greatly, and at the time
Hebert was decided, these operations were not yet in use.
My proposed approach towards Mr. Big is similar to the one the
minority put forward in Hart in that it relies on Charter grounds.
Nonetheless, the similarities stop here. Karakastanis J. proposed a
principled approach in order to determine if s. 7 applies to each
particular situation, and thus if the evidence should be excluded. I
argue that s. 7 should be used to illegitimatize the Mr. Big operations
entirely. Mr. Big leads to a breach of the individual’s right to silence,
and thus of s. 7. If this is the case, as per Herbert, the evidence obtain as
a result should automatically be excluded without the need for a
principled approach.
The approach proposed in this article would give value to the
words of McLachlin J. in Hebert where she stated that “[a]n
investigation of the ambit of a right or principle of fundamental
justice under the Charter necessarily involves consideration of the
underlying value which the right was designed to protect.”123 The
right to silence was designed to protect, according to the same case,
both individual freedom and the integrity of the justice system.124 By
excluding s. 7 from Mr. Big situations, the right to silence is partially
frustrated from its purpose. It is indeed time to acknowledge that the
Mr. Big sting is one of those situations where a partial protection
offered by a principled approach is not sufficient. Rather it is a legal
and moral compromise, unseen anywhere in the civilized world.125 It
tests our commitment to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its
relevancy.

VI. Conclusion
Police interrogations are a microcosm for some of our most fundamental
conflicts about the appropriate relationship between the state and the
individual and about the norm that should guide state conduct,
particularly manipulative, deceit, and coercive conduct in the modern
122. Ibid., para 76.
123. Ibid., at para. 61.
124. Ibid., at para. 62.
125. For how Western courts have curtailed Mr. Big — like operations see Kaiser,
supra, footnote 55, at p. 305.
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era [...] such interrogations go to the heart of our conceptions of
procedural fairness and substantive justice and raise questions about the
kind of criminal justice system and society we wish to have.126

While Mr. Big has proven efficient in securing convictions, this
tactic relies on deceit, manipulation, creation of alternate realities for
individuals, and ultimately a refusal of someone’s attempt to exercise
his right not to incriminate oneself. The evidence obtained is the result
of an alteration of an individual’s entire existence by using the
overwhelming power of the state. The issues with Mr. Big operations
begin far before the evidence assessment stage. They begin the
moment the state uses its resources to entrap an individual and use
him to obtain that which by law he cannot be compelled to give.
Numerous legal arguments can be made against the Mr. Big
technique, whether evidentiary, procedural or moral. In this article I
have chosen to focus on an argument that renders not only the
evidence inadmissible, but illegitimatises the entire operation. The
legal ground is set for extending the definition of what detention is to
all situations where the state has substantial control. Even if the
control is unknown to the suspect, it is the premise of each and every
one of the Mr. Big operations. Acknowledging that these operations
are in fact detention by the state would not be a stretch. Rather, it
would amount to a much needed recognition of the power the state
has over some of its most vulnerable citizens.

126. Leo R.A cited in Keenan and Brockman, supra, footnote 3, at p. 39.

